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Abstract This essay investigates a certain disturbance that appears at the moment
that philosophy is confronted with philological practices, as foreshadowed in Paul de
Man’s seminal work on the ‘return to philology.’ This disturbance appears vividly in
Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics with the sudden appearance of the ‘nonsense
word’ kzomil. Heidegger’s invented word suggests that philology is not immune to its
own unsettling techniques, as is also evident in Gerald M. Browne’s study of the Old
Nubian language. Ironically, we can characterize the object of philology more precisely
by turning away from ancient texts and toward Nathaniel Mellors’s absurdist television
seriesOurhouse.
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We did not just talk ourselves into this.
—Martin Heidegger
Ever since the publication of Paul de Man’s seminal text on ‘the return to
philology,’ there has been the question of the precise object of this philological
practice founded on reading – on ‘an examination of the structure of language
prior to the meaning it produces’ (De Man, 1986, 24). Such a philology could,
strictly speaking, by nature of this ‘prior,’ no longer have language as its object in
the sense that linguistic theory would. In an elaboration of De Man’s return,
Werner Hamacher suggests that ‘only one half of language is an ontological
process; philology must, therefore, also concern itself with the other half’
(Hamacher, 2009, 33) [‘Sprache ist nur halbwegs ein ontologische Prozeß; die
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Philologie hat sich auch mit der anderen Hälfte zu befassen’] (Hamacher, 2010,
50). Whereas Hamacher consequently characterizes language not as an object but
as objeu of philology,1 the present paper approaches the question of the
philological object from a different direction, namely by showing how the
deliberate construction of the object – whether anchored in philosophical or
classical philological discourse – cannot but have disturbing consequences.
In order to approach the philosophical side of the issue, consider Martin
Heidegger’s comments about reading words in Introduction to Metaphysics:
‘[T]o be’ [Sein], when written and seen, is different at once from ‘kzomil.’
This written mark is also a sequence of letters, of course, but one by which
we are unable to think anything. There is no such thing as an empty word –
only one that is worn out, yet remains full. The word ‘Being’ retains its
naming force. The slogan, ‘Away from this empty word “Being,” towards
the particular beings!’ is not only an overhasty but a highly questionable
slogan. (Heidegger, 2000, 83)2
Why is Sein offset with this kzomil, ‘the word by which we are unable to think
anything’? Heidegger, who otherwise is able to access the minute details and
inﬂections of words, up to and including the word Sein, here establishes
something of the differend of Sein. Kzomil is a truly empty word in the sense that
it doesn’t give anything to thought, yet ‘there is no such thing as an empty word.’
How then to read this, leaving aside the problematic question of how to translate
it from German to English (is the difference between kzomil and Sein different
from the difference between kzomil and Being)?
What could have pushed Heidegger to suggest this so-called empty word that
nevertheless by and large seems to follow the syllabic structure of German? In
order to ﬁnd out we need to backtrack slightly to Heidegger’s initial investigation
of the word ‘Being’. In the chapter preceding the one in which he coins kzomil to
offset Being as ‘meaningful,’ he tries in vain to ground the meaning of Being in
etymological or grammatical considerations. Heidegger starts out the chapter ‘On
the Grammar and Etymology of the Word “Being”’ with a conditional statement:
‘If for us Being is just an empty word and an evanescent meaning, then we must at
least try to grasp fully this last remnant of a connection’ (Heidegger, 2000, 55).
What follows is an aporetic consideration of the determination of Sein as a
grammatical form, into the realm of the etymology of the different stems of the
Indo-European words for ‘to be.’ He concludes:
(1) The grammatical examination of the form of the word had this result: in
the inﬁnitive, the word’s deﬁnite modes of meaning are no longer in effect;
they are blurred. […] (2) The etymological examination of the meaning of
the word had this result: what we today, and for a long time previously,
have called by the name ‘Being’ is, as regards its meaning, a blending that
levels off three different stem meanings […]. This blurring and blending go
1 ‘Objeu is the
object that
preserves in play
its freedom not to
ossify into the
object of a subject.
It is the counter-
play against the
objectiﬁcation of a
thing by naming
it’ (Hamacher,
2009, 33) [‘Objeu
ist das Objekt, das
im Spiel seine
Freiheit bewährt,
nicht zum
Gegenstand eines
Subjekts zu
erstarren. Es ist
das Widerspiel
gegen die
Vergegenständ-
lichung einer
Sache durch ihre
Benennung’]
(Hamacher, 2010,
52).
2 According to
Jacques Derrida,
the Introduction
to Metaphysics is
the moment from
which ‘Heidegger
renounces the
project of and the
word ontology’
(Derrida, 1976,
22), leading all the
way to the
crossing out of the
word ‘Being’ in
theQuestion of
Being. The onset
of this movement
is already
apparent in this
passage.
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hand in hand. The combination of these two processes provides a sufﬁcient
explanation for the fact from which we set out: that the word ‘to be’ is
empty and its meaning is evanescent. (Heidegger, 2000, 77–78)
Having failed to ground the meaning of Being in any etymological or grammatical
categories, Heidegger exclaims, ‘away from the empty schema of this word
“Being”!’ (Heidegger, 2000, 80). And escaping this emptiness, he invents the word
kzomil, which ‘when written and seen, is different at once’ from Being (Heidegger,
2000, 83; my emphasis). In other words, in order to escape the emptiness pervading
grammatical and etymological categories, Heidegger refers to reading and writing to
save Being, because ‘There is no such thing as an empty word. […] The word
“Being” retains its naming force’ (Heidegger, 2000, 83). What if kzomil here is
nothing but the effect of reading, as a disturbance produced by the introduction of
the reading act – ‘written and seen’? A meaningless word as an effect of the reader’s
attention to the fact that it is reading the word ‘to be’ that gives it sense? The fact
that Heidegger avoids any further engagement with kzomil, even up to the point
where the word is merely ‘seen’ and not even properly ‘read,’may be an indication.
Nevertheless, the fate of language as a whole depends on the meaning of Being that
is guaranteed by kzomil: ‘Suppose that there were no indeterminate meaning Being,
and that we did not understand what this meaning signiﬁes. Then what? Would
there just be one noun and verb less in our language? No. Then there would be no
language at all’ (Heidegger, 2000, 86; emphasis in original).
It is in relation to this rhetorical move toward the onset of reading, seeing a written
mark, and Heidegger’s immediate retraction from it, that I would like to situate De
Man’s ‘Resistance to Theory.’ In this text he addresses precisely the issues that arise
in the theoretical movement from grammar to reading at work in these sections of the
Introduction to Metaphysics, even if largely glossed over by Heidegger himself. It is
also within this ﬁeld of tension that I would like to place the philological tradition of
the medieval African language of Old Nubian, even though this work, for the
moment, still seems far removed from our current considerations.
According to De Man, ‘as long as it remains grounded in grammar, any theory
of language, including a literary one, does not threaten what we hold to be the
underlying principle of all cognitive and aesthetic linguistic systems’ (De Man,
1986, 14). We could wage the claim that classical metaphysics (any metaphysics
of presence) largely adheres to such a grammar-dependent system. To move
beyond grammar means to enter the domain of ‘reading,’ an act, however, ‘that is
systematically avoided’ (De Man, 1986, 15).3 Apart from the evidence provided
by the above passage from the Introduction to Metaphysics, the hostility that is
still felt toward the different modes of what has been called ‘deconstruction’ –
sometimes even branded ‘over-reading’4 – indicates the continuing existence of
such systematic avoidance.
Nevertheless, apart from certain areas of continental thought, there is another
realm – precisely the realm alluded to by De Man – that to a certain extent has
3 Another option
would be to
situate a certain
accessible
Absolute outside
the realm of
language (as
several
contemporary
philosophical
movements
suggest).
4 See the work of
Avital Ronell,
throughout an
afﬁrmation of the
potential of
strategies of
deliberate over-
reading (1989,
2007).
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embraced ‘reading’ (De Man, 1979), namely literary studies as an inﬂection of
philology. Although DeMan was mainly concerned with literature, we may extend
his observation to the classical realm of philology from which he derives his
theoretical apparatus. And indeed we ﬁnd that several scholars from the ﬁeld of
classical philology have attempted to embrace certain deconstructive practices,
precisely because of their attention to reading. Here we may point to the invitations
formulated by Alexander Gurd in his plea for a ‘radical philology.’ This philology,
grounded in speciﬁcally Derridean terms such as iteration and dissemination,
proposes textual criticism to be ‘the substance of ancient literature, not a tool used
to recover it’ (Gurd, 2005, 45). And: ‘Any edition or text may be “polysemous”
when read by interpreters; but it is in the hands of the textual critic that texts
disseminate themselves’ (Gurd, 2005, 46). Gurd proposes a series of readings of the
different sources, manuscripts and palimpsests underlying any historical textual
entity as constituting the philological practice of ‘establishing’ a text, that is, as
textual multiplicity, moving beyond the grammatically constrained ‘received texts.’
From another perspective, Hans Gumbrecht expands the modes of philological
research precisely by appealing to De Man’s ‘literary reading’ as proximate to the
types of reading that are already at work inside philological practice, even though
he never speciﬁcally addresses the differences (Gumbrecht, 2003, 35).
These two approaches to contemporary philological practice, from the side of
literary studies and classical philology, respectively, strengthen its bond with a
certain philosophical development; they are not without predecessors and
antecedents of their own and in no way do justice to the wide variety of
philological approaches – including the ones that are thoroughly critical toward
any ‘theory’ at all.5 Nevertheless, they indicate a certain future for philology that
would bring it again in closer alliance with philosophical practice, an alliance that
I would love to see ﬂourish. This alliance, though, may never be allowed to
consist in solely the appropriation of modes of reading developed outside classical
philological practice – as in our examples De Man and Derrida – without a
reciprocal demand, from the side of philosophy, to question any appropriative
strategy deployed by philology.
If we would follow DeMan’s argument, it would be impossible to ‘just’ apply a
theory of reading to classical texts without producing side effects. Such an
application necessarily produces a ‘disturbance’ that remains unnoticed on the
seismic monitors of both Gurd and Gumbrecht. According to De Man:
This undoing of theory [i.e., reading], this disturbance of the stable cognitive
ﬁeld that extends from grammar to logic to a general science of man and of
the phenomenal world, can in its turn be made into a theoretical project of
rhetorical analysis that will reveal the inadequacy of grammatical models of
non-reading. (De Man, 1986, 17)
Going back to the passage of Heidegger that I quoted at the opening of this essay,
the materialization of this ‘disturbance’ introduced by the (disavowed) practice of
5 For example,
Martin West:
‘Textual criticism
is not something
to be learned by
reading as much
as possible about
it. Once the basic
principles have
been
apprehended,
what is needed is
observation and
practice, not
research into the
further
ramiﬁcations of
theory.’ And E.J.
Kenney: ‘the
theorists… have
generally speaking
not edited texts or
have not done so
with much
distinction; the
best practitioners
have fought shy of
methodizing and
mechanization’
(both cited in
Gurd, 2005, 41).
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reading suddenly and unconsciously inserted into his philosophical argument after
the collapse of etymological and grammatical discourse is precisely the ‘empty
word’ kzomil. Heidegger, with De Man after him, registers the insufﬁciency of
grammatical analysis in his interpretation of Being, and provides – intuitively,
accidentally? – an onset toward a reading interpretation: writing and seeing.
On the surface, however, it does not seem to be the case that such disturbance,
which De Man calls ‘resistance to theory,’ appears in either Gurd or Gumbrecht.
Classical philology remains relatively undisturbed by the introduction of elements
of ‘reading’ or ‘deconstruction,’ simply because such elements seem to have
always already been present in philology. In other words, philology has already
been disturbed. What then is this disturbing object, or rather, what is the kzomil
of classical philology?
***
Philological practice, concerned as it is with marginality, textual/grammatical
apparatus and footnotes, is founded upon a study of occidental documents. Any
application of its techniques – ﬁne-tuned for a speciﬁc set of materials and
languages – outside its original realms causes a friction that seems to be largely
glossed over within philology whenever it focuses on its Greek and Latin ﬁelds of
interest. A ﬁrst indication of this friction is, for example, present on the title page
of Martin West’s standard introduction to philological technique, Textual
Criticism and Editorial Technique, which suggests that it is only ‘applicable to
Greek and Latin texts’ (West, 1973). As a speciﬁc mode of interaction with
language, philology is grafted onto philosophically oriented categories like
nouns, verbs, inﬂections and sentences. Although certain Near-Eastern, non-
Indo-European literary traditions such as Aramaic and Coptic have been able to
integrate themselves relatively smoothly into the paradigms of occidental philolo-
gical practice – they were already known by the time philology ﬁrst blossomed
and their grammatical differences have been accounted for and incorporated
within occidental grammar – there is one language that appeared on the scanners
of scholarship long after the last, Romantic revival and rejuvenation of philolo-
gical interest in ‘the Orient.’
Old Nubian entered occidental philological discourse at the beginning of the
twentieth century, in a collection of material published by Grifﬁth (1913). The
Old Nubian corpus, which dates from the eighth to the ﬁfteenth century, consists
largely of material that seems familiar: half Christian texts, half documentary
texts such as contracts, all written in a derivative of the Greek alphabet. No
extensive decipherment had to take place, as there were several living Nubian
languages in Northern Sudan to compare the material with – so it was thought
that Old Nubian was accessible to philology. Whereas other languages and
traditions, like the Sumerian or Chinese, may ﬁnd themselves at a comfortable
remove from western philological practice, either temporally or spatially, Old
Nubian literary texts insinuate themselves within this practice and are therefore
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forced to engage with it, even though, linguistically speaking, they are heir to a
tradition of which the only (and sparsely attested) predecessor is Meroitic
(Rilly, 2010).
Not only the time frame of Old Nubian, prior to its philological discovery, is
sealed off. We are also almost certain that no more material written in Old
Nubian will ever surface apart from the documents still stored in Oxford
archeological archives and inadequately labeled boxes under the staircases of
Egyptian museums: the entire area that once was home to the center of Nubian
civilization has become inundated after the construction of the Aswan Dam on
the Nile. The Old Nubian language, although far from a grammatical and stylistic
unity, therefore offers itself as a limit case for classical philological practice:
determinate in time and space and with a relatively small volume of a few
hundred pages, it seems to offer enough possible parallels to canonical texts, yet
remains stimulatingly unfamiliar.
Earlier I referred to the fact that classical philology has not displayed a
‘resistance to theory’ similar to the one that is still so acerbically haunting
philosophy. This may have been caused by a continuing practice of relying mainly
on grammatical and etymological evidence (or proceeding through the actual
materials), where acts of reading are institutionalized within a strictly organized
apparatus. This stable conﬁnement of any potential disturbance, however, is
shattered at the moment that classical philology leaves its conﬁnes and is
confronted with an object it cannot, strictly speaking, read: the Old Nubian text.
Not only do grammatical, etymological and lexicographical categories break
down in the face of Old Nubian textual material, but it also threatens the
continuity that has cushioned the proliferation of philology from classical texts
toward the study of classical texts.
One of the many testimonies to this difﬁculty that will remain insurmountable
for us is the essay ‘Old Nubian Philology’ by the classical scholar Gerald M.
Browne, who once stated: ‘About Old Nubian I have only to say that I pursued it
for the same reason that I bought a Yugo: I felt it needed me’ (Bay, 2006, 7).
Apart from the possible readings of investment and the ﬁgure of speech that
implies a constitutive link – ‘the only thing he has to say’ – between acquiring a
car and adopting or caring for a language, it remains a fact that Browne
singlehandedly inserted Old Nubian into the ﬁeld of classical philology.
Browne opens his article as follows: ‘My title is deliberately ambiguous: it
means not only the modern philologist’s approach to Old Nubian, but also
philology as once practiced in Nubia’ (Browne, 1985, 291). This ﬁrst sentence
immediately suggests that any contemporary philological practice is predicated
on the prior existence of such practice at work within the material that is
approached and appropriated by philology. Classical philology is able to deal
with the issues of grammar and rhetoric because these have always already been a
concern of the textual material. However, for philology to remain ‘operable’ in
this sense, such an activity needs to be assumed for any corpus – including the Old
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Nubian one – at the risk of the total breakdown of the ﬁelds of grammar and
rhetoric. The access to grammar would somehow precede grammar itself.
Browne assumes a philological practice in Nubia, based on ‘two passages in the
texts which appear to reﬂect a rather high level of philological expertise on the
part of the Nubian translators’ (Browne, 1985, 291). These translators purport-
edly translated from Greek to Old Nubian, thus offering a link between
Greek and Old Nubian philological practice that would legitimate, in its turn,
Browne’s philological intervention from out of the domain of classical philology,
thus limiting the possibly poisonous side effects of a reading that would depart
from a different, less convoluted structure or tradition. He strengthens his
assumption of the existence of Old Nubian philology by the positing of ‘an
impressive Nubian library.’ The papyri found in the Cathedral of St Mary the
Virgin in the Qasr Ibrim, which are commonly referred to as P. QI (Browne
and Plumley, 1988), supposedly belonging to this library would ‘[n]ot
only […] substantially increase our knowledge of the Nubian language, in two
places – the ﬁrst in Text 1, the second in Text 9 – they appear, if I have
properly interpreted them, to attest to an interest taken by their translators
in matters philological’ (Browne, 1985, 292). Browne’s act of interpretation rapidly
moves beyond the texts to project ‘translators’ interested in ‘matters philological.’
The ﬁrst text, P. QI 1.9, is identiﬁed by Browne as a translation of a part of
Rev. 14:6–15. He states the following: ‘[I]ts evidence is quite straightforward,
though the interpretation less so’ (Browne, 1985, 292). Let us put aside the difference
that Browne suggests between ‘evidence’ and ‘interpretation,’ which evokes the
classical separation between recensio and examinatio, as this supposed difference is
not constitutive of his argument. In order to facilitate an interpretation that would
bring forward an Old Nubian philological tradition, Browne does not start by
citing the Old Nubian fragment, but rather with the Greek text from the Textus
Receptus, which he calls, parenthetically, ‘a convenient point of departure’ (Browne,
1985, 292). We are left to gather the Old Nubian text from another publication:
oulgrikon einise ilka harmla pesin aigille: paeso agendegouelo dilgoul
diragouesin ŋollokō dieigoul elekkan alo pessna seuartil, tan korpajjigoulo
paja ŋesakkoannoa ŋeserannojoun, ten ŋeeigoullon tekka ergijona harmi-
kiskil. (Browne and Plumley, 1988, 57 [P. QI 1 9.ii.11–13]; transliterated
from the original script)
Καὶ ἤκουσα φωνῆς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ λεγούσης μοι, Γράψον,Μακάριοι οἱ νεκροὶ
οἱ ἐν Κυρίῳ ἀποθνήσκοντες ἀπάρτι· ναὶ, λέγει τὸ Πνεῦμα, ἴνα ἀναπαύσωνται ἐκ
τῶν κόπων αὐτῶν· τὰ δὲ ἔργα αὐτῶν ἀκολουθεῖ μετ’ αὐτῶν. (Revelation 14.13)
[‘And I heard a voice from heaven, saying unto me, Write, Blessed are the
dead which die in the Lord from henceforth: Yea, saith the Spirit, that
they may rest from their labours; and their works do follow them.’]
(King James Bible)
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Without bothering to read the Old Nubian passage as a whole, Browne jumps
onto the ‘translation’ of the Textus Receptus wording ἴνα ἀναπαύσωνται in the
Old Nubian text, supposedly rendered by ŋesakkoannoa ŋeserannojoun. Based
on the repeated verbal root ŋes, Browne concludes that the scribe must have given
two alternatives based on different variations of the Greek Vorlage (the transla-
tion’s prototype), namely the ἴνα ἀναπαύσωνται of the Textus Receptus and a ὅτι
ἀναπαύονται, a ‘hitherto-unattested but hardly surprising combination’ (Browne,
1985, 292). His interpretation is as follows:
In a stage of textual transmission prior to what we ﬁnd in our Nubian
manuscript, ŋesakkoannoa ‘in order that they may cease’ may be presumed
to have stood alone in the text, as representing the widely attested ἴνα
ἀναπαύσωνται, while ŋeserannojoun ‘because they cease’ was added, most
likely in the margin, as a variant reading. Later – in the stage represented by
the Qasr Ibrim piece – a scribe simply incorporated the marginal variant
into the body of the text. The fact that the Nubian piece displays a variant
reading may imply a certain amount of philological awareness on the part of
its translator: we can readily imagine that he had access to at least two
Greek manuscripts and sought to represent their salient textual differences.
(Browne, 1985, 293)
Browne’s misinterpretation of the repetition as a philological exercise is based on
his failure to account for the transitivizing sufﬁx -ar, assimilated to -ak, preceding
the ﬁnal sufﬁx -koannoa. The verb form ŋesakkoannoa implies that something is
ceased, put down, namely their korpajjigoulo, or labors. The ﬁrst instance of the
verb therefore refers to the putting to rest of work, whereas the second instance
refers to the resting of the dead themselves. Whereas the Greek medial construc-
tion ἴνα ἀναπαύσωνται ἐκ τῶν κόπων αὐτῶν is able to convey both senses in one
verb, such construction is absent in Old Nubian and perhaps the scribe found it
necessary to be more explicit.
Moreover, Browne decides to ignore the other anomalies in the Old Nubian
rendering of the passage from Revelation, for example, the addition of ‘many’
[dieigoul], the erroneous spelling of ‘their’ as tan and the addition of harmikiskil [‘up
to heaven’] in the last line. All in all, this is enough evidence to suggest that perhaps
something other than intense philological activity was taking place. It remains
unclear whether we are dealing with philological practice or scribal invention.
We can also readily picture Browne ‘imagining’ the Nubian scribe, bent over
his Greek manuscripts, working within the philological tradition that he holds so
dear. Nevertheless, ‘in absence of proof, we can do no more than tentatively
suggest that the translator’s motivation was philological’ (Browne, 1985, 293).
But why then this imagination? Why this tentative suggestion ‘in absence of
proof,’ even though the ‘evidence is quite straightforward’? Was it perhaps
Browne himself who ‘heard a voice from heaven, saying unto him, Write’? No
further reasons are given for these philological reveries. Instead, he continues with
The disturbing object of philology
449© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2040-5960 postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies Vol. 5, 4, 442–455
a ‘second passage of interest in this discussion of possible philological activity in
Nubia,’ in which he discusses the possible inﬂuence on the Nubian translator’s
work of Origen’s Hexapla, ‘clearly an esoteric reference work, obviously not
intended for general circulation’; we thus have ‘evidence of more than ordinary
scholarship.’ He infers this access to philological resources from the fact that
several elements in the (damaged) Old Nubian translation of verse 9 of Psalm 31
deviate from the Septuagint version in a way not unlike Symmachus’s Greek
translation of the same psalm. But ‘indeed,’ he states in a footnote, ‘it is also
possible that the translator merely rendered a Greek version already inﬂuenced by
the Hexapla’ (Browne, 1985, 293).
Once again, Browne’s textual evidence is ﬂimsy, relying on tentative restora-
tions. Nevertheless he claims that ‘[t]his passage from the Psalms, together with
that previously discussed from Revelation, suggests – if my interpretations are
correct – that the Old Nubian translators had some training in philological
method’ (Browne, 1985, 295). Here we encounter the culmination of Browne’s
own rhetorical collations. Not only does he posit – without reservation –
‘ordinary scholarship’ and the existence of ‘Old Nubian translators’; they even
had ‘some training in philological method,’ a method that Browne at the same
time is extremely eager to apply to a corpus that seems to resist it with all its
grammar and style. This resistance not only destabilizes the boundaries between
grammar and style but also constantly forces Browne to relegate thorny
grammatical issues to style and rhetoric. He even has to stabilize his analyses
with retro-translations from the Old Nubian reconstructions to Greek or Coptic
Vorlages. For example, Browne justiﬁes his retro-translation of The Old Nubian
Miracle of Saint Menas as follows:
The most convincing proof [i.e., more convincing than linguistic and
contextual evidence] of a Greek Vorlage for the Nubian tale is the ease with
which the latter can be turned into the former: the text is unusually
susceptible to a literal retroversion into Greek comparable to the vulgar
idiom of Pomjalovskij’s miracle stories, as the reader can see for himself by
examining the hypothetical reconstruction of the Greek that I have printed
below the transcript of the Nubian. Though convinced of a direct Greek
model for our text, I nevertheless merit the view that the Greek may have
derived from a Coptic archetype, and for the curious reader I have
attempted a reconstruction of this archetype.
(Browne, 1994, 3–4; my emphasis)
Thus Browne reconstructs not only the Greek Vorlage, but also a hypothetical
Coptic archetype of the Vorlage itself! By constructing this hypothetical tradition of
translation to serve as a buffer between the extreme foreignness of Old Nubian and
the comfort of the familiar grammatical territories of Greek and Coptic, he enables
himself to be a mediator for the philological tradition that legitimates his own access
to those texts. In fact we could claim, with Giorgio Agamben, that for Western
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culture this is the only method through which such mediation could take place: ‘In
our culture, which lacks speciﬁc categories for spiritual transmission and exegesis, it
has always fallen to philology to guarantee the authenticity and continuity of the
cultural tradition’ (Agamben, 2007, 162). We are witness to a situation in which
the classical methodology of recensio and examinatio collapses: the derivation of the
Old Nubian text from the Greek consistently interferes with examination of the
relation between the Old Nubian and the imaginary Greek Vorlage.
Faced with these delirious moves, we in our turn may refer again to
Gumbrecht, who states that ‘Philological resistance to theory […] would be the
name for a desire to identify with what does not lend itself to identiﬁcation and, as
a consequence, a name for a lack of tact that threatens to transform the texts to be
edited into the editor’s own texts’ (Gumbrecht, 2003, 36). Browne’s insistence on
a Nubian philological tradition can therefore be captured in what De Man refers
to as an ‘undue phenomenalization or […] any undue grammatical or performa-
tive codiﬁcation of the text’ (De Man, 1986, 19). This phenomenalization of ‘the
inadequacy of grammatical models of non-reading’ (De Man, 1986, 17) results
from the barriers that do not allow an effective reading of the Old Nubian corpus.
We could therefore consider the spectral appearance of fully and properly
readable Vorlages in Browne’s work on Old Nubian as such phenomenalizations.
Imaginary texts regulate the access to unreadable meaning.
The last paragraph of Browne’s essay ﬁnally points to the underlying desire
that has been motivating his entire essay, the desire of the philologist. After
referring to ‘a more pertinent analogue’ of a scribe stuck in the ‘Egyptian village
of Karanis, an outpost of civilization on the verge of the Fayum’s inhospitable
desert’ (Browne, 1985, 296), he states:
I have the feeling that the men who translated Greek in Medieval Nubia
would have been sympathetic with the Egyptian scribe’s plight. Cultural
wastelands can often be conductive to the reﬁnement of intellectual
pleasures: faced with a bleak and dismal landscape, the mind seeks solace
within itself, and the gentle art of philology – as I have learned from
practicing it in an area culturally not unlike Nubia – is a remarkably
effective anodyne for boredom and despair. (Browne, 1985, 296)
Perhaps we should only admire Browne’s candor (or just plain bathos) in this ﬁnal
passage, but it points toward more than a personal predicament. Old Nubian, in
its writing and in its content, seems to suggest that such an identiﬁcation between
philologist and scribe, reader and writer, is possible, or at least allows itself to be
interpreted as an opening toward an identiﬁcation to come. But it turns out that
instead of welcoming the philologist with the warm familiarity that has been
transmitted ever since the earliest Greek sources, he is radically obstructed. And
on the edge of the impossibility to identify, there is, I think, a true possibility to
rethink the grammatical, etymological and rhetorical practices that philology
takes for granted – a rethinking that hopefully will attain the same depths as the
The disturbing object of philology
451© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2040-5960 postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies Vol. 5, 4, 442–455
ones Heidegger was propelled to in his consideration (and ﬁnal crossing out) of
Being after his confrontation with kzomil.
***
To conclude this text, as a sort of reprise, but also to open it up to a possible
direction that philology allied with philosophy might take, I would like brieﬂy to
address the work of the British artist Nathaniel Mellors. In an interview with
Nicolas Bourriaud, Mellors states that his ‘narratives are played out in scenarios
where the relationship between word and external reality has often slipped, or is in
the process of slipping, further away from sense.’ The characters wrestle with this
‘confusion’ and he is ‘particularly interested in the systematic disconnection of a
collective and consensual measure of reality through language’ (Bourriaud, 2010,
n.p.). In another interview he suggests: ‘my means of responding is in the idea of
language as a kind of currency, to make a subject of the manipulating of language’
(Mellors and Wright, 2012, n.p.). Mellors’s properly philological investigations of
language, which he gathers under the term ‘scriptwriting,’ are launched system-
atically throughout his oeuvre along several trajectories that traditionally form the
(disavowed) limits of philological inquiry: time, pain, circulation.
We may start to trace one of these philological limits by inspecting one of
Mellors’s works as documented in the Book A or Megacolon or For & Against
Language, namely Ourhouse (2010). In doing so, we may hope to engage in an
exercise that is ‘post-philological,’ as Michelle Warren suggests: ‘The postmodern
gesture of philology lies in removing the idea of a privileged center from the
conception of critical practice and in analyzing the symptoms of desires for
original artifacts – desires that permeate philology, modern aesthetics, and
colonial power relations alike’ (Warren, 2003, 36).
In Ourhouse, a television series based on the popular sitcom format, Mellors
reaches one of the clearest articulations of what wemay venture to call his kzomilitant
approach – a militancy for that ‘by which we are unable to think anything’
(Heidegger, 2000, 83) – where Heidegger’s last resort to save Being from mean-
inglessness, and Browne’s imaginary philological tradition, materializes into ‘The
Object.’ The ﬁrst episode ofOurhouse opens with a sequence of scenes obsessed with
recording and reading, from the opening sequence where a spelling bee becomes a
scene of torture and abuse, Daddy’s injunction that ‘[u]ndocumented experience is life
thrown down the lavatory’ (Mellors, 2010, 157), and the scene in which he reads a
cryptic letter under water until it dissolves (Mellors, 2010, 162). The scenes leading up
to the discovery of ‘The Object’ establish an environment of interrupted transmissions
andmisconnecting switchboards.6We cut from a scene in which Daddy and Babydoll
discuss a number of her art objects in an empty gallery space, speaking in a total
parody of International Art English. Daddy points to a q-tip sticking out of the wall:
Daddy: Hmmmmmm. Hmmmmmmm. This, this! (pointing) I absolutely
love this. It makes it! What were you thinking with this?
6 The sequence can
be viewed on
Nathaniel
Mellors’s Vimeo
page: https://
vimeo.com/
53407537 (from
24’00’ onward).
See also Ronell
(1989) for an
analysis of
telephony on
which we silently
rely.
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Babydoll: It’s – broadcasting. That part is broadcasting.
Daddy: Genius. (Mellors, 2010, 175)
We cut to Truson, struggling to install an answerphone system, a ﬁgure of short-
circuiting signals and closing down the lines of incomprehensible communication
(Mellors, 2010, 168). The phone rings, and Truson ‘feels compelled to speak’
(Mellors, 2010, 176):
Suddenly, as if a switch were ﬂipped, his awareness of The Object is
activated. He can see something alien in the room. He drops the phone. It
is tangled with the answerphone and bounces and dangles on its cable.
Truson opens his mouth and eyes wide in terror then unleashes a
tremendous and continuous scream which rattles through the house.
Truson: Argghhhhhhh! (Mellors, 2010, 176)
The various family members hear his scream and enter the room with ‘The
Object.’ However, staring intently at it, no one is able to see it for what it is. In
fact, their communication falls apart into an incoherent exchange. Here the entire
apparatus of Mellors’s kzomilitancy becomes apparent:
Truson (anxious, mechanical, smiling): I can’t hear it above 8 miles. Silent,
and approximate point of feedback of less than one inch above 300
megahertz. It is the sound of death, feeling, death, feeling, it’s a frequency
it has a bandwidth and we could make a radio station for it we could make
dead radio if we weren’t inside the mirror. If we could break the composite
we could make it. It can’t think outside the loop. Help me.
(Mellors, 2010, 184–185)
‘The Object’ in Ourhouse presents a real and deﬁnitive obstacle to the full
production of language – it cannot be properly read – and in its interaction with
the characters inOurhouse reveals each one of them as animatronic sculptures in
which language suddenly becomes completely divorced from the body. It is an
object – alternately guessed as ‘hourglass,’ ‘cypher’ and ‘reaper’ – incessantly
devouring and puking out entire libraries without ever allowing for a direct line of
communication. It is trapped in a loop and only a dead radio station may dream
of catching its airwaves. Mellors’s Object is, in other words, yet another allegory
for the object of philology: that which it cannot yet read but must.7
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